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1. Introduction  
The need to understand the way scientists understand principles from the philosophy 
of science is generally overlooked, but potentially vital in helping dialogue between 
science and philosophy progress beyond accusations of naivety on the philosophers' 
side, or accusations of irrelevance from scientists. This study presents a sociological 
look at how scientists talk about one frequently raised philosophical principle, Oc-
cam's razor. In analysing scientists' discourse around Occam's razor, it aims to provide 
the scientists' perspectives as well as exploring when and how Occam's razor is being 
represented as a fundamental principal in science, and thus has a use for scientists be-
yond its philosophical message. It also indicates a subtle difference in the interpreta-
tion of the principle between scientists and philosophers.  
 This study is not intended to demonstrate that scientists disagree on philosophical 
ideas, which would probably not come as a surprise to many. But neither is it intended 
to show that scientists are philosophically naïve, or that they are in need of more rig-
orous philosophical education. Instead it takes scientists ideas of Occam's razor on 
face value and classifies the different categories in which the talk about it, and the rhe-
torical uses to which it is put. 
 
While there is a rich tradition of philosophical and historical studies examining scien-
tists' work in practice and comparing that work with philosophical theorising (Dono-
van et al., 1992; Brush, 1989), there is little work that examines scientists' own concep-
tions of the philosophical foundations of science. Researchers in science education 
and public understanding of science (PUS) often argue that it is important to know 
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about how science is “really done” (in Durant’s 1993 phrase, see also Gregory and 
Miller 1998). A lot of research in science education in particular has focussed on as-
sessing topics from the philosophy of science for the purposes of teaching about sci-
ence (Matthews, 1994; Osborne et al,. 2003; Koponen, 2006). For this reason several 
studies in these disciplines have looked at scientists’ philosophical opinions (Wong & 
Hodson 2009 on scientists, Osborne et al., 2003 on experts in general, though that in-
cludes some scientists; Nieman, 2000 and Turney, 2001 for philosophies in popular 
science books), either to ground science teaching on philosophies as they are held by 
scientists, or as an interesting question in its own right. Other sociological and phi-
losophical studies on scientists’ opinions on philosophy (Mulkay and Gilbert, 1981 on 
Popper; Bailer-Jones, 2003 on models) have sought to draw philosophical conclusions, 
by using scientists' insights to inform philosophical theorising. Direct comparison of 
these studies is difficult as they focus on different philosophical themes and were per-
formed with different aims in mind.  
 This paper will add to these studies by looking at a philosophical concept not yet 
covered, as well as presenting a more general argument on how the social study of sci-
entists' opinions of philosophy can help inform philosophical thinking and inform 
communication between scientists and philosophers. Occam's razor is often seen and 
justified by philosophers as an intuitive rule. The argument that appeal to the philoso-
phers' own intuition is often inadequate as a foundation for philosophical discussion is 
also advanced by the recent school of “experimental philosophy”, which aims to use 
the empirical methods to investigate how people think about philosophical issues and 
use the results to inform philosophical debate (Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007). In a 
similar vein, I intend this study to investigate how the intuitions over simplicity are 
held by scientists, and how they can open up new directions in the philosophical dis-
cussion on Occam's razor. 
 I will start by giving a quick introduction to some of the philosophical debate sur-
rounding Occam’s razor. I will then present the results from 40 qualitative interviews 
with purposively selected university-based scientists in the UK and France1. The scien-
tists have been selected to provide a roughly even split of physics/astronomy, chemis-
try and life sciences. I have chosen scientists that are research active, and that repre-
sent a roughly even split of career stages from postdocs and PhD students to lecturers 
to full professors. I have also tried to achieve a roughly representative split between 
male and female scientists. Bearing in mind that female scientists are still very under-
represented in science, slightly above quarter of respondents were female. 
 There was some unavoidable vagueness about who to count as a scientist, and I 
settled on the doctorate as a criterion for being a scientist, although I also interviewed 
three people who were studying towards one. I have chosen to limit myself to the dis-
ciplines outlined above as, unlike say psychology or economics, they are unquestiona-
                                                     
1As this paper is part of a larger project on scientists' opinions of philosophical topics (Riesch 2008), the 
rationale for including French scientists as well as UK based ones was to investigate if the French 
tradition of philosophy of science following Bachelard and Canguilhem had any marked influence on 
scientists' views, this however turned out not to be a major factor. Some of interviews were held in 
French, in which case I have presented my own translation below, with the original in a footnote.  
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bly regarded as scientific. The interviews show a much more varied and nuanced array 
of opinions and convictions towards the simplicity principle than is usually supposed, 
both in philosophical and popular science accounts of Occam’s razor. There may be a 
slightly different way in which Occam’s razor is discussed to the way the simplicity 
principle is discussed, suggesting possibly that Occam’s razor has specific connota-
tions for scientists that the mere discussion of simplicity has not. I will finish by point-
ing towards some of the implications of this study that I see concerning the philoso-
phical discussions of Occam’s razor.  
 The interviews have all been analysed as part of a larger project on scientists’ views 
of philosophical topics, and I have therefore looked out for a variety of philosophical 
themes discussed by a corpus of popular science books which were then followed up 
in interviews. Of the various topics, Occam’s razor, and/or a version of the simplicity 
principle was one of the most prominent in the books (Riesch 2008). 
 The interviews coded with qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. My decision to 
perform a qualitative study, rather than polling scientists’ opinions on philosophy or 
Occam's razor quantitatively was made because philosophical concepts are interpreted 
and thought about in such a variety and subtlety that simply counting the numbers of 
scientists who agreed or disagreed with Occam's razor will not give any worthwhile in-
sight into the thinking of scientists. Instead, this study is meant to be charting the va-
riety and diversity of opinions on the topic rather than their representativeness, and by 
talking in depth to a much smaller group of scientists I have been able to assess and 
interpret the diverse opinions. 
2. Occam's razor 
In the interviews Occam’s razor was introduced usually like this: “When you are faced 
with two theories (hypotheses, statements etc) that, other things being equal, both de-
scribe the available evidence equally well, is it sensible to choose the simpler one”? 
This rather vague formulation captures the essence of what the principle is generally 
held to say, and through its vagueness gave plenty of room to the respondents to in-
terpret the principle as they like it best. It also possibly echoes the vagueness in most 
philosophical introductions to Occam’s razor. In the question I have put to the inter-
viewees I have explicitly formulated Occam’s razor as a question of theory choice. 
This is the way the razor is usually introduced by contemporary philosophers (Baker, 
2004). Kuhn (1977) for example has argued for simplicity as a value to consider when 
choosing a theory. Philosophical introduction often emphasise the intuitive character 
of Occam's razor especially to scientists, and proceed to find a justification for that in-
tuition. 
2.1 What is simplicity? 
One of the central questions in philosophical discussion on Occam’s razor is the ques-
tion of what exactly we mean by simplicity. Historically there has been a rather con-
fusing array of definitions which even include the contradictory opinions of simplicity 
as high probability and simplicity as low probability (Sober, 1975 p.vii). In technical 
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applications of the razor, like ones in decision theory and artificial intelligence, the 
principle can achieve rather complicated ideas of simplicity that fulfil the formal crite-
ria set by the philosopher so that the principle performs the desired task. 
 Suppose we have the choice of two lines that both fit the data, a straight line and a 
circle. Aesthetically, both seem equally simple. Mathematically, the straight line is eas-
ier to describe, unless we switch to polar coordinates. It appears therefore that what is 
simpler is often dependent on background assumptions of the scientist mulling over 
it. Philosophical discussions such as that of Popper (who attached simplicity to the 
concept of testability), and Sober (who defines simplicity as informativeness) have 
provided formalised solutions to such problems, but it is ironically precisely the most 
sophisticated philosophical definitions of simplicity that are in danger of being ignored 
by scientists, because they are too complicated to be useful in routine scientific prac-
tice. This does not matter in specialised contexts such as finding epistemological justi-
fications or for designing rules for reasoning in artificial intelligence, where most re-
cent discussion of Occam’s razor has taken place. It does however affect its usefulness 
to actual scientists whose intuition has started the whole question in the first place. 
Therefore, even if we find an epistemologically satisfactory answer to the problem of 
simplicity, it may well fail as a methodological, normative principle for scientific prac-
tice, even if it is satisfactory for the philosophical discussion. Also of course, being ig-
nored by scientists because it is too complicated does not mean that these rules are ir-
relevant. 
 The formulation which I have given above is open to interpretation on other 
points as well: what do we mean by “other things being equal”? Can we really imagine 
a case where all other things really are equal? In the absence of a clear definition of 
what we really mean by simplicity, the phrase “all other things” has no clear meaning 
either. And even so, how do we decide what the other things are that matter, and 
which ones do not? This clause is itself a topic of serious philosophical discussion 
which often goes beyond its scientific practicality (Schiffer 1991, Pietroski and Rey 
1995), and therefore not directly relevant to the interviewed scientists. 
2.2 Three types of Occam's razor? 
For the purposes of interpreting the scientists' perceptions of the razor, I propose to 
classify it into three categories. These three categories are meant to chart the possible 
usefulnesses of Occam’s razor, they are not meant to be mutually exclusive, as it is 
perfectly possible that Occam’s razor has several uses or justifications. Baker (2004) 
distinguishes between epistemic principles of simplicity (it is rational to believe the 
simpler theory) and methodological justifications (it is rational to adopt the simpler 
theory “as one’s working theory for scientific purposes”) of Occam’s razor. To this I 
will add a third type of principle, a variation of Baker’s epistemological one, which I 
have come across on several occasions: It is rational to believe in the simpler theory 
because that is what the world is like. 
 It should be stressed that these categories have arisen out of the analysis of the in-
terviews and were not preconceived ideas into which I then tried to force the scien-
tists’ opinions. This is the reason I judged it best to introduce three main divisions 
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rather than the two that Baker talks about (because the ontological razor forms a large 
part of the scientists’ own conversations of simplicity), and for this reason they are 
slightly vague and do not correspond exactly to the way philosophers such as Baker 
have discussed them. This is especially true of what I call the methodological razor, 
which equates simple with whatever the scientist mulling over a theory choice prob-
lem finds easier (personal preference) or socially more convenient (social norm).  
a) The methodological razor 
Under this application of Occam’s razor, it is more a practical matter that we should 
choose the simpler option. I call it “methodological”, with Baker, because it prescribes 
Occam’s razor as a method for doing science. If there really is no other reason to 
choose one way or the other, why should the scientist make her already stressful life 
harder by choosing the complicated option? 
 While nobody suggests that the scientist should go for the more complicated op-
tion, this justification of the value of simplicity for science is speedily dismissed by 
some philosophical commentators such as Popper: As Popper is generally looking to 
find a logic of science, purely practical considerations are “extra-logical” (Popper 2002 
[1934] p.122), and therefore not quite what he is looking for when he tries to define 
simplicity and why or whether it is a good idea. The injunction that the scientist 
should go for what is easier often depends on the personal preferences of the individ-
ual scientist (or, again, on social norms), and can in these circumstances not serve as a 
normative and logical philosophical principle. However, there are also occasions when 
there is an objective basis on what is simpler in this sense; for example some equa-
tions really are harder to solve than others. 
b) The epistemological razor 
Instead, it is frequently argued that the scientists’ intuition to prefer the simpler hy-
pothesis must rest on an understanding that it is the best way to proceed for reaching 
an understanding of the world. This for example is Popper’s position, as he argues 
that simplicity is an intrinsic value of a good scientific hypothesis. In fact, because 
Popper defines simplicity to be nothing other than the degree of a hypothesis’ testabil-
ity, it is one of the cornerstones of Popper’s methodology, getting a whole chapter to 
itself. Note that this does not depend on an understanding that the world will eventu-
ally turn out actually to be simple ― it merely supposes that by consistently choosing 
the simpler hypothesis, we will gradually get a better understanding of the world 
whether it is simple or not. 
 The same goes if we suppose simplicity to be an approximation. It can be argued 
that a hypothesis is simpler because it is only an approximation, much in the same way 
that “3” is a simpler value for pi than “3.141”. In this sense of simplicity, we have the 
almost counterintuitive result that the simpler a hypothesis, the further away it is from 
a faithful description of the world, but the more likely it is to be true. 
 These two contrary ways of identifying simplicity also lead to the quite incredible 
fact noted by Sober above, that the simplicity in Occam’s razor has both been identi-
fied with being probable (the simplicity-as-an-approximation idea), and with being im-
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probable (Popper’s idea of simplicity-as-testability rests on the idea that the more 
likely something is to be true, the less falsifiable it actually is). 
c) The ontological razor 
Here we assume that fundamentally the world is simple, and because it is simple any 
successful scientific theory must mirror that fact. This idea has a considerable intuitive 
appeal for some people, and has been justified through the argument of the uniform-
ity of nature, which underlies the principle of induction. If we try to find generalisable 
laws of science from induction, then we will have to assume at least some sort of uni-
formity of nature. If we observe a pen to fall ten thousand times, then the simplest as-
sumption is that it will fall the ten thousand and first time as well.  
 Going further than mere inductive reasoning, however, the ontological idea of 
simplicity is one that pervades such fundamental quests as the search for the “theory 
of everything”, as it is in essence trying to explain the world with as few forces and 
particles as possible. In a similar way often the ideas of beauty, elegance or aesthetics 
of a scientific theory betray a conviction that the world is in some way easily under-
standable. 
 The phrase “choosing a theory” is usually ambiguous because it can mean accept-
ing a theory or merely using it to pursue your science. In the methodological and the 
epistemological razor, theory-choice is therefore of the second type. It is a practical 
thing to do either because it is easier or because it systematically leads us to progress 
in science. In the ontological razor however, theory choice should usually imply accep-
tance as the truer theory. 
3. Occam's razor in the interviews 
In approaching the scientists for interviews I have aimed to achieve a roughly even 
split between the biological and the physical sciences, where I considered the physical 
sciences to be physics/astronomy and chemistry. Since of course not everyone who is 
approached agrees to be interviewed, a precise split was impossible to achieve. Disre-
garding the pilot interviews (marked numbers 1 to 4 in the quotes below, which were 
based on a convenience sample of a UK physics and astronomy department), the 
eventual numbers were 16 biologists, 16 physicists and 4 chemists. The fact that 
chemists were the least likely to respond to my approach is interesting, and ― as one 
of the chemists noted in the interview ― may suggest that chemists are much less 
likely to worry about philosophical issues. There were however also issues of career 
structures, as the movement between chemistry and physics ― and sometimes be-
tween physics and biology ― was quite fluent. Several interviewees started with a 
chemistry background and moved to work in physics departments, or started in phys-
ics and moved to biology (in which case I've noted the interviewee's background dis-
cipline as well in the quotes below). The eventual numbers mean that, including the 
pilot interviews, there were slightly more physical scientists in the corpus than biolo-
gists, and this is reflected in the spread of quotes below. Considering the whole of our 
conversations on other philosophical topics and general attitudes towards philosophy, 
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I have not found that there is much difference in philosophical interest and opinions 
between the disciplines.  
 A third of the interviews were held in Paris, and three interviewees had experience 
of working in both Anglophone and Francophone countries. 28 respondents were 
male, 12 were female, which is probably a fair reflection of the gender proportions in 
science generally. 13 respondents were early career, which were mainly postdoctoral 
researchers and on three occasions PhD students. 13 respondents were mid career, 
meaning lecturers, senior lecturers or readers or their French equivalents. 14 were sen-
ior researchers, i.e. full professors and equivalent. 
 In terms of general attitude and interest in philosophy, and Occam's razor in par-
ticular, I did not detect any striking differences between genders or career stage. 
French scientists were more likely to be aware of the French philosophy of science 
traditions following Bachelard and Canguilhem, though they did not generally influ-
ence the scientists' ideas on science. In fact though most French scientists were aware 
of Bachelard as a general philosopher, many did not know of his work on philosophy 
of science. 
 The interviews were fully transcribed and coded using qualitative data analysis 
software. Every interviewee was asked about their opinions on the value of simplicity 
for science, as well as selected other topics. Though the interview schedule was not 
fixed for the pilot interviews, the discussions there all touched on simplicity as well, 
and therefore they are included here as part of the main analysis. Comments on the 
value of simplicity were coded (see the appendix for the coding frame), and the pri-
mary codes were then organised into broader categories. Comments on what Occam's 
razor or simplicity is or should be fell into three broad groups: Comments about the 
razor being a practical maxim designed to make the scientist's life easier, comments 
that were giving a specific epistemological justification for why a simple theory or hy-
pothesis is valuable and lastly comments that speculated about the nature of the world 
being simple. The first two categories I found mapped well onto Baker's division be-
tween methodological and epistemological interpretations of Occam's razor, while the 
third type of comment seemed somewhat apart as it talks about the nature of the 
world, rather than the nature of science. I have therefore divided the scientist's com-
ments into three sections that represent the three types of razor I have outlined above. 
 During the interviews, I tried to assess whether the scientists were in favour of 
Occam’s razor or not. While I have received a few unambiguous answers, usually delv-
ing deeper into the question revealed a more nuanced view that differentiated between 
different interpretations of simplicity. Seven interviewees even regarded Occam’s ra-
zor or simplicity as important enough to mention it during the initial stages of the in-
terview when we discussed their general opinions on scientific method. Regardless of 
their opinions of what simplicity really is, interviewees also often stressed that Oc-
cam's razor is very intuitive, but that it is also very difficult to judge in practical situa-
tions when a hypothesis really is simpler than the alternative. 
Although a few scientists rejected Occam's razor outright, there was general agree-
ment that simplicity is important in science. This however mostly took the form of the 
methodological razor. When the interviewees tried to go beyond practical considera-
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tions, there was little agreement over what simplicity really is, and why it should help 
in science.  
3.1 The ontological razor and intuitive evaluations of simplicity 
As the interviews were part of a larger project aimed at identifying scientists’ attitudes 
towards scientific method, sometimes Occam’s razor or more rarely some mention of 
the importance of simplicity have frequently come up spontaneously in the conversa-
tion without being directly prompted by me. That alone indicates that at least for 
some people, Occam’s razor is centrally important to their view of science. In several 
cases the principle formed an integral part of scientific method for the respondents. 
Scientific method is that within some system you make hypotheses, you make testable hypothe-
ses, you test them, and you keep the ones that are verified, and you throw out the ones that are 
falsified. If you have two hypotheses which are verified, which explain the same phenomenon, 
you use Occam’s razor and take the simplest. (32 Senior, Physics, Male, France/En) 
However, further discussion often revealed that people are only confident that at best 
they have merely a “gut-feeling” that this is the best way to do science, and that they 
don’t really see any particular reasons why a simple hypothesis should be better. One 
difficulty about determining what role Occam’s razor should play in science is that it is 
bound with the scientist’s attitude towards truth itself, as with the ontological razor 
presented above. We cannot believe that Occam’s razor helps us in uncovering the 
truth if we don’t believe science is in the business of getting the truth. When I asked 
the scientist quoted above whether he thinks that a simpler hypothesis is more likely 
to be true he remarked that 
I don’t really think anything is true, that’s the problem I’ve got, because I mean I get a bit, I get a 
bit allergic to absolutes, so… the… there’s no doubt that it’s a practical thing, at least, but is it 
only this, is the question I guess. (32 Senior, Physics, Male, France/En) 
If nothing else, Occam’s razor here seems a practical consideration. Its epistemic 
worth is not really being questioned, but it is at least sidelined. 
 Another scientist who thought that Occam’s razor was “absolutely critical” re-
marked in the subsequent discussion that he would not be able to explain why Oc-
cam’s razor should apply, even though he was sure it did. When I asked whether a 
simple hypothesis is more likely to be true, he hesitated before ultimately responding 
that it is, but that this opinion rested merely on a “gut feeling”. 
Respondent: …simplicity is more likely to be true… but don’t quote me on that [laughter]. 
Interviewer: Well, if you ask me not to… 
Respondent: No, you can say what you like, I mean that facetiously. Just I couldn’t stand up in 
front of, you know, various philosophers and defend that remark. (7 Senior, Biology, Male, UK) 
There was also a sense among some respondents that we know that simple is more 
likely to be true, but we just don’t know why. The following remark also came up in 
an unprompted discussion of Occam’s razor: “I wish we could work out why mathe-
matical beauty is a good guide to the universe”. (2 Early Career, Physics, Male, UK). 
Note here also that mathematical beauty is being seen as the simplicity that Occam’s 
razor is about. 
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 What I call the ontological razor therefore seems to have at least had some follow-
ers among the interviewees. While there was a general consensus that we can’t really 
prove it, some people had a very strong feeling that it somehow is right. This argu-
ment was sometimes backed up by the argument that for us to be able to do science at 
all, the universe has to be understandable. If nature was not uniform and therefore in 
some sense simple, science would be impossible. Similar to the popular expositions of 
the search for a Grand Unified Theory (Greene 2000), there were also some com-
ments that explained the quest for that theory of everything with the search for sim-
plicity. 
That is, we search for a theory of everything because it’s a theory that explains everything, and 
that [inaudible] simple. (33 Senior, Physics, Male, France)
2
 
In the same vein, people also very often spoke about the beauty, aesthetics or elegance 
of theories. 
3.2 Explanations for simplicity and the epistemological factor 
Some respondents have ventured to find an explanation of what useful simplicity 
should be other than an intuition or a gut feeling, while others have provided argu-
ments why they think it can’t be done. One respondent had a rather negative initial re-
action to Occam’s razor, but provided an explanation of how simplicity could be de-
fined, which he sees as useful in science: 
And actually my PhD supervisor always used to say, on this aspect of agreeing with data, he’s 
only interested in the first factor of two. Get within the factor of two, and then the interesting 
physics ends, and somebody else can work out the details. So what I think he means by that is 
that you want an idea that explains broadly lots of things to a reasonable degree of accuracy, 
rather than one idea that explains one thing to a billionth of a percent. (23 Early Career, Physics, 
Male, UK) 
 This is a variation of the idea that simplicity is defined as an approximation. There-
fore, even though Occam’s razor is recognised by the respondent as being valuable for 
science, it does not in fact entail that the underlying world is simple. A similar idea of 
simplicity as an approximation was also made by other respondents.  
 One identification of the meaning of simplicity was that of testability. One respon-
dent who initially reacted very guardedly towards Occam’s razor, admitted that how 
you define simplicity is difficult. Nevertheless on reflection he gave this idea of what 
simplicity could mean, and why it’s useful in science: 
I like the simplicity for that matter, I like the Darwinian natural selection principle, it’s very beau-
tiful you start with one idea and it explains many things. (9 Senior, Physics, Male, UK) 
 Another related idea was to identify simplicity with the number of “degrees of 
freedom”, or parameters. 
There, I want to say that… I myself see it like, I think it’s, maybe a, there is an analogy with the 
number of degrees of freedom. […] It’s the number of independent parameters that you have for 
explaining a dataset. (35 Senior, Biology/Physics, Female, France)3 
                                                     
2 “ C’est, on cherche la théorie de tout parce que c’est une théorie qui explique tout, et ça [inaudible] 
simple”. 
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 Quite often though, people reacted spontaneously questioning the whole principle 
of Occam’s razor, precisely because it’s hard to define what simplicity actually is. Oth-
ers have pointed out that it’s the background knowledge you have that determines 
what you find is simpler. 
3.3 Criticisms of Occam's razor: the merely methodological razor and outright rejections 
One of the most common responses was that Occam’s razor is useful, but mostly for 
practical reasons. This practical choice argument was also often made by people who 
thought there was something more to simplicity but couldn’t say exactly what. Even 
those who argued that simplicity was easily definable and gave such a definition ar-
gued that at the very least that’s why we go for it. Curiously however, people who 
completely disagreed with Occam’s razor often also made the same argument: While 
Occam’s razor has misled us in the past, and may even be harmful to our understand-
ing of the world, it still makes no practical sense to go for the more complicated op-
tion. 
 For many people just the practical aspect of the razor was enough to agree with 
Occam’s razor, but then some also argued that that isn’t always the case, either. 
[Occam’s razor] tends to make good biological sense, because it is less resource wasting to use a 
simpler way of doing something than a complex way of doing something. Although that isn’t al-
ways true, and in certain circumstances you find multiple pathways that actually achieve the same 
thing, because it’s so important that if that didn’t happen, then life would cease, or whatever. 
But… on, you know, on sort of a day to day basis it usually holds true, I would have thought. (8 
Senior, Biology, Female, UK) 
 Not everybody reacted positively towards Occam’s razor, even in the limited sense 
of the methodological razor. One respondent was talking about the difficulty he had 
with general definitions of scientific method, as they didn’t give him any practical, use-
ful hints on how to proceed when faced with radically different worldviews. Here he is 
talking about the difficulty he faced when explaining to a friend why he shouldn’t be-
lieve in creationism: 
I mean, I don’t buy Occam’s razor, either, particularly, I mean it’s something you use, but it’s not 
very useful when you’re comparing various, different paradigms. (21 Mid Career, Physics, Male, 
UK) 
 Another possible reaction was to question not whether it is sensible to choose the 
simpler one, but whether we should choose at all. This actually tied into the respon-
dent’s beliefs about the value of scientific realism, and therefore led her to reject the 
razor as a practical guide on what to believe, if not on what to work with. If all things 
really are equal, why do we have to chose at all? 
[W]ell if there is sufficient evidence for both, then I believe both happily. And then wait for 
more… I mean if the experimental data doesn’t favour one of them, why should I believe the 
simpler one? […] I probably would because it’s easier to understand, easier for my brain to work 
on, but if they both show sufficient data, then either of them might be right or neither of them 
                                                                                                                                       
3 “La, je veux dire que… je le vois moi comme un, je crois un, peut être, il y a une analogie avec nom-
bre de degrés de liberté. […] C’est le nombre de paramètres indépendants que vous avez pour expli-
quer un système de données”. 
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might be right, so I’m happy to believe both until one is disproven. (25 Early Career, Biology, 
Female, UK) 
 Another argument was that Occam’s razor only gets us to the next best solution 
for a problem, and possibly harmful as it leads us up blind alleys. Following the sim-
pler theory would lead us only to the local, rather than the global minimum: 
So all you do is you take small steps in the right direction. And to me that’s what Occam’s razor 
is like, is that you say, this is the, this is... I’ll go in this direction… doesn’t mean you end up at a, 
what’s called a global minima, you end up in a, most likely, local minima. […] So you would have 
thought maybe Occam’s razor would keep you trapped in that little corner (21 Mid Career, Phys-
ics, Male, UK) 
 An even more extreme reaction is to argue that not even is Occam’s razor not giv-
ing us any practical help in deciding which theory to go for, it may even be harmful to 
our understanding of the world, as it is maybe more wishful thinking. 
But at the end of the day, if you want to understand that phenomenon or something completely, 
probably going a little complex would help (22 Early Career, Physics, Female, UK) 
 Finally, it is perfectly possible to actually argue inversely and hold to an epistemo-
logical razor which does not correspond to a methodological one: While simplicity is a 
good guide to the universe, it doesn’t mean it’s the easiest or most practical option ― 
or even the most elegant.  
4. Discussion 
4.1 Occam's razor vs. the principle of simplicity and the social representation of simplicity 
Although Occam's razor is frequently held to be a critical part of science that is intui-
tively held by scientists, in the interviews a slightly different story about Occam’s razor 
unfolds. While for some interviewees, Occam’s razor indeed forms an integral part of 
scientific method, this view was not held very often, and was quickly qualified in the 
discussion as either meaning that it doesn’t really have any real implications for getting 
at the truth as such, because that concept is itself highly problematic, or that its intui-
tiveness, the “gut feeling” it conveys, is all we really have to justify it. 
 Curiously, most of the people who did venture an explanation of what could be 
meant by simplicity, are those that did not specifically react with mentioning Occam’s 
razor to my initial question. It was also the case that people who did offer an explana-
tion of what simplicity could mean, did not really like talking about “simplicity” be-
cause it is such a vague concept. In this they actually echo the discussion by Popper 
(2002, p.131, addendum to the 1972 edition), who gives his definition of simplicity as 
testability, but then argues that he does not want to get bogged down on whether this 
really is the definition that best captures our intuitions of simplicity, and instead wants 
us to concentrate on the epistemic benefits of testability. That is reflected by the 
number of people in the interviews who initially reacted positively towards Occam’s 
razor but then offered an explanation of what could be meant by simplicity for the 
principle to become valid, an opinion which is not that much different in fact to some 
of the people who disagreed with Occam’s razor or the simplicity principle, but then 
also offered an explanation of what simplicity could be for the principle to be valid. 
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There was also a group of interviewees who arrived at a negative conclusion, rejecting 
Occam's razor altogether. This can either take the form of people disagreeing that 
simplicity is definable at all, to people who argue that simplicity can even be harmful 
to science. 
 What this suggests is that there is a difference about how people talk about Occam’s 
razor and how they talk about simplicity. While Occam’s razor in the interviews found a 
lot of agreement as a critical principle in science, it usually got qualified when the dis-
cussion turned to simplicity itself. Simplicity on the other hand, received a good 
amount of critical discussion which reflects a surprising amount of variation of opin-
ions.  
 The theory of social representations (Moscovici 2000, Bauer and Gaskell 1999 and 
2008) may help here in analysing the scientists' perception of the razor. When a group 
of people is confronted with new concepts, they seek to anchor them to concepts or 
ideas they are already familiar with. Through this different social groups can converse 
and communicate on certain topics without necessarily seeing eye-to-eye on the pre-
cise interpretation. This process also insures however that interpretations of concepts 
can easily shift in subtle ways as they travel to new communities. In this case there is 
the added factor that scientists are continuously told, by philosophers, popular science 
communicators such as Hawking (1988 p.61) and other authority figures, that Oc-
cam's razor is an integral and well accepted part of science. Moscovici had in fact ex-
plicitly intended his theory of social representations to be a social psychology of 
knowledge, and even saw it as a social psychological explanation for Kuhn's idea of 
paradigms (2000 p.151): through the mechanism of anchoring, new representations 
always have an aspect of things already familiar, which leads to a certain conservatism 
when groups are confronted with new concepts. As a theory of public representation 
of scientific concepts, it has been applied by Bauer and Gaskell (1999) and Farr 
(1992), particularly within research on science communication. 
 Nieman (2000) has interpreted philosophical remarks in popular science books as 
boundary building in the sense of Gieryn (1999), which sets up a simple demarcation 
criterion for authors to show that they are conforming to proper scientific practice by 
showing that they adhere to well accepted philosophical principles. Occam's razor, as I 
have analysed in a separate study of popular science books (Riesch 2008), fulfils much 
the same function as a boundary marker. The concept of social and epistemic bounda-
ries elaborated by Gieryn I have argued is linked with social representations, because 
the boundary separates disparate groups which assimilate boundary-spanning concepts 
and develop their own representations of them. Through this, communication be-
tween groups is eased because even without agreeing on details the groups can still use 
the same vocabulary. However, this also means that there are bound to be conceptual 
differences in the interpretation of these concepts. When faced with the imperative to 
comply with what is usually presented as accepted scientific practice, scientists anchor 
their interpretations of Occam's razor to what they are familiar with, in this case their 
own experience of scientific work. If epistemic or ontological interpretations of sim-
plicity don't much feature in their own work, Occam's razor acquires a methodological 
interpretation, because that corresponds most closely to the scientists' own experi-
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ence. The scientists' own representations of Occam's razor has thus acquired a differ-
ent meaning from how philosophers discuss it, without necessarily being seen as a dif-
ferent concept by either group. This, as I will argue below, has some consequences for 
how philosophy of science itself uses the concept, particularly since, as Mosccvici ar-
gues (p.150), the original representation is changed as much in the process as the new 
one acquires its meaning. Philosophers can themselves be influenced by how scientists 
interpret Occam's razor (for example through the insistence of its intuitiveness to sci-
entists). 
4.2 Implications for the philosophy of science 
In contrast to how it is often portrayed in philosophy, simplicity as a criterion for the-
ory choice is not held intuitively by all scientists. As outlined above, while a few ques-
tioned Occam's razor outright, many others believed Occam's razor to be a pragmatic 
choice that is only relevant to make the scientist's life easier, rather than either an inte-
gral part of scientific method or even a pointer to the theory that is more likely to be 
true. This “lowest common denominator” option for Occam's razor however has al-
ready been dismissed by Popper and other philosophers as not really embodying the 
real importance of simplicity. Therefore one immediate lesson for philosophy is that 
referring to scientists' intuitions is a poor justification for starting to look at why we 
should need simplicity in discussions of scientific method. That is of course not to say 
that simplicity is not a useful principle, but it conceivably lessens the importance we 
think we should attach to it. 
 I would also argue that there is a more positive message for philosophy to be had. 
As some previous philosophical studies such as Bailer-Jones (2003) have done, we can 
look to the scientists' views of philosophical concepts to open up new directions of 
research in philosophy of science, directions which can make a real claim of reaching 
practical relevance for science. The fact that there is a new strand in the philosophy of 
science that seeks to philosophise on actual scientific practice, evidenced by the estab-
lishment of the Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice, shows that there is 
has recently developed an undercurrent of concern within philosophy about its rele-
vance to scientific practice. 
 Given the importance of the methodological interpretation of simplicity within sci-
ence, there are a host of new questions for philosophy to analyse, which have previ-
ously been largely dismissed. This is not to say that philosophy needs to come to more 
positive conclusions about the methodological razor, however by theorising on ques-
tions that are of actual importance to scientists, philosophical analysis can start offer-
ing value to scientists as well as philosophy itself, and thus transcend some of the bar-
riers of language and interpretation that exist between philosophy of science and sci-
entific practice. 
 This leads to the question of translation between philosophical and scientific lan-
guage, and I think the most important lesson this study points to. Scientists, far from 
ignoring philosophical principles as they are often caricatured, have actually taken 
some principles on board, and attached their own meanings to them which reflect the 
way they themselves think about science. This as I pointed out through social repre-
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sentation theory is in a way expected, as scientists hear about Occam's razor, from 
their own scientific education or popular science books that inspired them as kids 
where adherence to the principle is presented as a defining characteristic of science, 
yet not further explained. Subsequently, when they think about the science as they 
practice it, they can easily come to anchor their understanding of Occam's razor 
through their own experience of science. If a scientist has come to believe that Oc-
cam's razor is a defining norm of science, and since of course everybody thinks they 
are doing good science themselves, so their interpretation of Occam's razor will con-
form to their own way of practising science. 
 It is precisely through the iconic character that Occam's razor has acquired within 
the scientific community that it has lost most of its philosophical force: Because eve-
rybody thinks they need to adhere to it, it has become watered down for some scien-
tists so much that it conforms to their science, but is uninteresting philosophically (as 
evidenced by Popper's swift dismissal of the methodological razor, or Baker's very 
cursory glance at it). This is not to say however that the scientists' understanding of 
philosophy in this case is naïve or unsophisticated. On the contrary, I have found 
plenty of intelligent introspection and thoughtful argumentation over the value of 
simplicity in the interviews, which demonstrates that philosophical musing is alive and 
well within science. But this also means that by acquiring this iconic status, the phi-
losophical principal as understood by the scientists has changed meaning from its phi-
losophical origins. 
 If meaningful dialogue between philosophy and science is to continue, we need to 
make sure that we and the scientists talk the same language. While it is tempting to rail 
against scientists that they misunderstand philosophy, we will have to be aware that 
scientists will always muse about their activity on their own terms and in their own 
language, and if philosophy wants to have any part in contributing to these musings 
and understanding the scientists' point of view, it must look at the way philosophical 
terms are used and understood in science, track the rhetorical and discursive uses they 
are put to, and work out the implications of that philosophical rhetoric. In this sense a 
sociological understanding of scientists' philosophical discourse can help philosophers 
re-establish a connection with scientific thought and practice.  
Appendix: Coding Frame 
1. General 
Simplicity difficult to judge 13 
Simplicity generally accepted by scientists 6 
Simplicity is intuitive 10 
simplicity: different for biology and physics 1 
simplicity: no clear cases where OR applicable 2 
Used to believe in simplicity 1 
2. Initial reactions 
Initial reaction to simplicity guarded 11 
Initial reaction to simplicity negative 8 
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Initial reaction to simplicity positive 13 
Initial reaction to simplicity, mentioning Occam 7 
Spontaneous mention of Occam 6 
Spontaneous mention of simplicity 1 
3. Epistemological/what is simple 
Epistemological razor 1 
Simple valuable as approximation 7 
Simplicity as explaining a lot with a little 2 
What is simple depends on background knowledge 3 
Simple possibly same as likely/probable 6 
simplicity: No. of parameters 1 
Simple not the same as likely 2 
4. Ontological 
Simple is more likely to be true 7 
Simple is not more likely to be true 21 
World actually quite complicated 1 
World is unlikely to be simple 1 
Beauty 15 
Elegance 1 
5. Methodological 
Simple is more useful/practical 29 
Simplicity not necessarily the easiest/most practical 1 
6. Role of simplicity in science 
simplicity useful for dealing with ad hoc theories 3 
Simplicity has fooled us in the past 3 
Simplicity helpful in science 8 
Simplicity in everyday life 2 
Simplicity in GUT (“Grand Unified Theory”) 6 
Simplicity may be harmful to science sometimes 6 
Simplicity unhelpful in science 3 
simplicity: No GUT possible 2 
simplicity: not always applicable 1 
Simplicity: OR invalid 2 
We should not be afraid of complexity 1 
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